A Primal-Dual Approach to Markovian Network Optimization by Yu, Yue et al.
1A Primal-Dual Approach to Markovian Network
Optimization
Yue Yu, Dan Calderone, Sarah H. Q. Li, Lillian J. Ratliff and Behc¸et Ac¸ıkmes¸e
Abstract—We formulate a novel class of stochastic network
optimization problems, termed Markovian network optimization,
as a primal-dual pair, whose solutions provide an dynamic
stochastic extension to Wadrop equilibrium principle. We further
generalize such network optimization to accommodate variable
amount of flow and multi-commodity flows with heterogeneous
planning time windows, features that are well-motivated in
applications arise from game-theoretic settings. Finally, in order
to solve the primal-dual pair, we design dynamic programming
based numerical algorithms that outperform state-of-the-art com-
mercial software (Gurobi) in extensive numerical experiments.
Index Terms—Network optimization, Markov decision process,
mean field games
I. INTRODUCTION
The optimal flow and potential problem is a primal-dual pair
whose solution is an equilibrium in networks with interactions
of a mechanical or economic nature [1]–[5], which arises
in a variety of applications including constrained resource
allocation and routing in communication or transportation net-
works. For instance, the traffic assignment problem, which has
received significant attention [6]–[10], is a primary example in
which a population of self-interested agents seek shortest paths
through a network with congestion effects; that is, a network
such that the cost of an edge increases with the amount of
agents using it.
In many of the existing approaches, one challenge in en-
suring network optimization abstractions, such as the traffic
assignment problem, are practically relevant is incorporating
environment stochasticity into the model. In particular, real-
izations of flow allocations may depend on exogenous random
variables; e.g., routing of airplanes depends on stochastic storm
evolution [11], planning of ride-sharing drivers depends on
random demand from riders [12]. In these cases, solutions
based on shortest path problem fail to capture the uncertainty
in flow allocation decisions.
To overcome this challenge, Calderone & Sastry [12], [13]
proposed a network optimization model based on, instead
of shortest path problem, Markov decision process (MDP)
[14], [15]. This model considers a population of self-interested
agents seek optimal sequences of actions, which achieve the
lowest expected accumulated cost, in a network environment
with stochastic dynamics, where cost of an action also in-
creases with the amount of agents using it. The solution to
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the network optimization gives a stochastic dynamic extension
to Wardrop equilibrium [9], [10], where all agents are using
optimal policies such that no individual agent can benefit from
unilateral switching to other policies [12], [13]. Such equilib-
rium has a variety of applications in modern transportation
including ridesharing and parking [16].
Although [12], [13] serves as a first step toward a more
general class of stochastic network optimization problems, it
has the following limitations: (i) it only consider the scenarios
where the amount of agents is fixed in advance, and all agents
have homogeneous planning time windows, and (ii) the solu-
tion method relies exclusively on off-the-shelf software, which
fails to fully exploit the network structure. In this paper, we
address these limitations by proposing a general framework of
stochastic network optimization problems, termed Markovian
network optimization. In particular, we make the following
contributions:
1) We introduce a novel class of stochastic networks, named
Markovian networks. Such networks provide a unified
perspective to optimization problems in MDP [14], [15],
namely problem (P-1) and (P-2), and MDP congestion
games [12], namely problem (P-3) and (P-4).
2) We introduce novel extensions of Markovian network
optimization problems that consider (i) variable amount
of agents in problem (P-5) and problem (P-6), and (ii)
agents with heterogeneous planning time windows in
problem (P-7) and problem (P-8). We illustrate the new
features of our proposed model via a multi-commodity
ridesharing game example in Section IV-A.
3) We also answer the question of how can dynamic pro-
gramming, widely used method for MDP, improve the
efficiency in solving Markovian network optimization.
In particular, we propose dynamic programming based
algorithms, Algorithm 3–8, for problem (P-3)–(P-8) that
consistently outperform state-of-the-art commercial soft-
ware (Gurobi) over extensive numerical experiments in
Section IV-B.
In addition to these contributions, our work also uncovers,
to our best knowledge, previously unobserved connections
between network optimization [1], [2], multi-agent MDPs [17],
[18], and mean field games [19]–[24]. Our contributions to
each individual area can be interpreted as follows.
• Network Optimization. We extend existing network opti-
mization models by combining the features of dynamic
network flow problems [25], [26], where the network
has a time-expanded structure, and those of stochastic
shortest path problems [27], where each edge leads to a
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
08
73
1v
2 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  3
0 S
ep
 20
19
2probability distribution over possible successor nodes.
• Multi-Agent MDPs. We provide novel optimization mod-
els and numerical algorithms to estimate the collective be-
havior of large number of agents solving an MDP, where
the cost experienced by agents is subject to congestion
effects [12].
• Mean Field Games. We generalize mean field games
over a graph [23], [24] from continuous action space to
discrete action space, where the game equilibrium can
be found efficiently by solving a convex optimization
problem.
With these interpretations, our work forms an intersection of
these existing areas, and provides a unified perspective to their
individual developments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we define the concept of Markovian networks, introduce
Markovian network optimization, and provide generalizations
that capture variable divergence and multi-commodity flow. In
Section III, we develop dynamic programming based numer-
ical algorithms to solve the optimization problems proposed
in Section II. In Section IV, we provide numerical examples
that demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of these al-
gorithms. Finally, we conclude with discussion and comments
on future directions of research in Section V.
II. MODELS
In this section, we introduce the concept of Markovian
networks—i.e., networks embedded with the structure of
MDP—and develop the optimal flow and optimal potential
problem on a Markovian network, whose optimality conditions
are characterized by the Kolmogorov equation, the Bellman
equation, and generalized Ohm’s law.
We use the following notation: denote R the set of real
numbers, R+ the set of nonnegative real numbers; denote [N ]
the set {1, 2, . . . , N} for integer N ; denote aijk the ijk–th
component of the three-dimensional tensor a ∈ Rn1×n2×n3 ,
and analogously, aij for the two-dimensional case.
Given this notation, we introduce Markovian networks as
follows. Consider a directed network with T recurrent layers,
labeled by [T ]. Each layer contains S state nodes and A action
nodes, labeled by [S] and [A], respectively. Within each layer,
there are S ·A edges, each pointing from a state node towards
an action node. Between two adjacent layers, there are A · S
edges, each pointing from an action node in the current layer
towards a state node in the next layer. At layer T , edges from
all action nodes reach a root node. State nodes are sources
that generate flow. Action nodes conserve and redistribute flow
follows: if the flow from state node s to action node a in the
layer t is ytsa, then the flow from action node a in layer t to
state node s in layer t+ 1 is given by
∑
s′ Ps′asyts′a, where
P ∈ RS×A×S+ and
∑
s Ps′as = 1 for all s
′ ∈ [S], a ∈ [A].1
The root node is a sink that absorbs all incoming flow. See
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 for an illustration.
Based on this definition, we show that a finite-horizon
MDP [14] is equivalent to a linear optimal distribution and
1Here we assume P is independent of time; its time dependent extension
is straightforward.
...
...
...
. . . . . .
actionsstates states
layer t
Fig. 1: A Markovian network
s
...
...
∑
s ′ Ps ′1syts ′1
∑
s′
Ps′As
yts′A
yt+1,
s1
yt+1,sA
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differential problem [1, Sec. 7A] in Section II-A. We then
introduce the general optimal distribution and differential
problem in Section II-B, which are further generalized to the
case with variable divergence and multi-commodity flow in
Section II-C and, respectively, Section II-D.
A. Linear Optimal Distribution and Differential Problems
We start with the linear optimal distribution and differential
problem on a Markovian network, which is equivalent to the
linear programming formulation of finite-horizon MDP [14].
In this way, we provide a network perspective of MDP, which
is summarized in in Table I, and set the stage for the general
optimal flow and potential problem later.
We consider the following linear optimal distribution prob-
lem [1, Sec. 7A] on a Markovian network:
min.
y
∑
t,s,a
ctsaytsa
s.t.
∑
a
y1sa = p1s,∑
a
yt+1,sa = pt+1,s +
∑
s′,a
Ps′asyts′a, t ∈ [T − 1],
ytsa ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [T ], s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A]
(P-1)
where y ∈ RT×S×A denotes the flow on edges; c ∈ RT×S×A
denotes the constant edge cost; P ∈ [0, 1]S×A×S is the given
transition kernel; p ∈ RT×S+ denotes the divergence on state
nodes, i.e., amount of flow generated by sources. We assume,
without loss of generality, that
∑
s p1s > 0. Notice that once
y is given, the flow on all the edges are determined.
3The dual of (P-1) is given by the following linear optimal
differential problem:
max.
v
∑
t,s
ptsvts
s.t. vTs ≤ cTsa
vts ≤ ctsa +
∑
s′
Psas′vt+1,s′ , t ∈ [T − 1],
∀s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A].
(P-2)
where v ∈ RT×S denotes the potential on state nodes, which
is known as value in the MDP literature [14], [15].
The following theorem shows that solution to (P-1) and
(P-2) are coupled together by optimal policies, which define
the optimal sequences of actions inductively.
Theorem 1 ( [14] ). If y solves (P-3) and v solves (P-4), then
∑
a
yt+1,sa = pt+1,s +
∑
s′,a
Ps′asyts′a, t ∈ [T − 1], (1a)
vts = min
a
(
ctsa +
∑
s′
Psas′vt+1,s′
)
, t ∈ [T − 1], (1b)
for all s ∈ [S] with ∑
a
y1sa = p1s and vTs = min
a
uTsa.
Further, if ytsa > 0, then
a ∈ argmin
a′∈[A]
cTsa′ , t = T
a ∈ argmin
a′∈[A]
(
ctsa′ +
∑
s′
Psa′s′vt+1,s′
)
, t ∈ [T − 1] (2)
for all s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A].
Optimization problems (P-1) and (P-2) are also known as
primal-dual linear programs of an MDP, which have been
studied extensively due to their elegance of theory, compat-
ibility with constraints, and facility for sensitivity analysis
[11], [14], [15], [18], [28]. Such linear programs of MDP
model the optimal sequential decision making in a stochastic
environment. In this setup, variable y denotes the state-action
frequency, which gives the probability of choosing each action
in each state; variable v denotes the values, which gives the
expected accumulated cost starting from each state; parameter
P gives the one-step transition probability between every
two states when an action is chosen [14]. See Table I for
a detailed comparison. The relation between this stochastic
sequential decision making model and our network flow model
is analogous to the relation between the Brownian motion of
electrons and Kirchhoff’s circuit laws: the former focuses on
microscopic behavior of an individual particle, whereas the
latter focuses on the macroscopic behavior of flow, which is
a collection of large amount of homogeneous particles.
B. Optimal Distribution and Differential Problems
A main limitation of (P-1) and (P-2) is that they fail to
capture congestion effect: the cost of using an action increases
with its user volume. Such effect arises in variety of network
games where the flow represents a population of competitive
selfish players, e.g., the journey time on a route increases with
the amount of vehicles using it, the price of a product increases
with the amount of its buyers [10]. Key to these games is the
Wardrop equilibrium principle, which says all strategies used
at equilibrium are optimal such that no individual agent can
benefit from unilateral switching to other strategies [7], [9],
[10]. In this section, we will show how to capture congestion
effect using a generalization to (P-1) and (P-2), whose solution
defines a novel class of Wardrop equilibrium.
Consider the following generalization to (P-1):
min.
y
∑
t,s,a
∫ ytsa
0
φtsa(α)dα
s.t.
∑
a
y1sa = p1s,∑
a
yt+1,sa = pt+1,s +
∑
s′,a
Ps′asyts′a, t ∈ [T − 1],
ytsa ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [T ], s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A]
(P-3)
where φtsa is a continuous increasing function peculiar to edge
tsa, which generalizes the constant ctsa in (P-1).
The dual problem of (P-3) takes the following form:
max.
v,u
∑
t,s
ptsvts −
∑
t,s,a
∫ utsa
φtsa(0)
φ−1tsa(β)dβ
s.t. vTs ≤ uTsa
vts ≤ utsa +
∑
s′
Psas′vt+1,s′ , t ∈ [T − 1],
∀s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A].
(P-4)
where u ∈ RT×S×A denotes the tension on edges.
TABLE I: Network perspective of MDP
MDP concepts Network interpretations
initial state distribution divergence
state-action frequency flow
immediate cost tension
value potential
Kolmogorov equation Kirchhoff’s current law
Bellman equation Kirchhoff’s voltage law
Problem (P-3) and (P-4) extend the optimal distribution
and differential problem [1, Sec. 8D, 8G] to a stochastic
dynamic network. Consequently, their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions [29, Sec. 5.5.3] define a stochastic dynamic
class of Wardrop equilibrium as follows.
Theorem 2 ( [12] ). If y solves (P-3) and (u, v) solves (P-4),
then∑
a
yt+1,sa = pt+1,s +
∑
s′,a
Ps′asyts′a, t ∈ [T − 1], (3a)
vts = min
a
(
utsa +
∑
s′
Psas′vt+1,s′
)
, t ∈ [T − 1], (3b)
utsa = φtsa(ytsa), t ∈ [T ], a ∈ [A], (3c)
for all s ∈ [S] with ∑
a
y1sa = p1s and vTs = min
a
uTsa.
Further, if ytsa > 0, then
a ∈ argmin
a′∈[A]
uTsa′ , t = T,
a ∈ argmin
a′∈[A]
(
utsa′ +
∑
s′
Psa′s′vt+1,s′
)
, t ∈ [T − 1], (4)
for all s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A].
Notice that unlike the constant cost c in equation (1b) and
(2), the action cost u in (3b) and (4) is a variable itself, and
coupled together with flow variable y via (3c).
4Remark 1. Theorem 2 defines a stochastic dynamic class of
Wardrop equilibrium as follows. Consider a game played by
a large population of players, each trying to find the optimal
policies defined by (4), and the cost of using action a in state s
at time t increases with the amount of agents using it according
to (3c). Then (3) and (4) together define a Wardrop equilibrium
for this game where policies used by any players (such that
ytsa > 0) are optimal in the sense of equation (4). This
ganeralizes the Wardrop equilibrium used in traffic assignment
problem [7], [9], [10] by extending routes on a deterministic
static network to policies on a stochastic dynamic network.
Equation (3a) and (3b) are the discrete time Kolmogorov
equation and, respectively, Bellman equation. The equilib-
rium characterized by their continuous time version was first
introduced in mean field games literature [19], [20] and
later extended to network setting [21]–[24]. Such equilibrium
describes the collective behavior of a large number of players
where the inter-player interaction is mediated by a mean
field. In our model, such a mean field is described by (3c).
The optimization problem (P-3) was first introduced in MDP
routing games [12] where all flow enters at t = 1. This
assumption is relaxed here to allow flow entering the network
at any time, and further relaxed later in Section III-D to allow
flow exiting at any time.
C. Optimal Flow and Potential Problems
An important feature of network optimization is variable
divergence: the divergence on each source decreases with
corresponding potential. In the network games, the basic
premise behind such an assumption is that each player has
the option of quitting and is motivated by the anticipated cost
[10, Sec. 2.1.2]. If we adopt this assumption in problem (P-3),
we obtain the following optimal flow problem:
min.
y,x
∑
t,s,a
∫ ytsa
0
φtsa(α)dα−
∑
t,s
∫ xts
0
ψts(α)dα
s.t.
∑
a
y1sa = x1s,∑
a
yt+1,sa = xt+1,s +
∑
s′,a
Ps′asyts′a, t ∈ [T − 1],
ytsa ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [T ], s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A]
(P-5)
where ψts is a continuous decreasing function. Compared with
(P-3), the flow divergence x is variable rather than constant.
The dual problem of (P-5) is the optimal potential problem
given by the following.
max.
v,u
∑
t,s
∫ vts
ψts(0)
ψ−1ts (β)dβ −
∑
t,s,a
∫ utsa
φtsa(0)
φ−1tsa(β)dβ
s.t. vTs ≤ uTsa,
vts ≤ utsa +
∑
s′
Psas′vt+1,s′ , t ∈ [T − 1],
∀s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A].
(P-6)
The following theorem extends Theorem 2 by introducing
a coupling between divergence x and potential v.
quantity
price
demand ψ
supply φ
y
(a) Problem (P-5.1)
quantity
price
demand ψ
supply φ
v
(b) Problem (P-6.1)
Fig. 3: The objective of problem (P-5.1) (shaded area in Fig 3a
) and (P-6.1) (shaded area in Fig 3b) achieve optimum at the
intersection point of supply curve φ and demand curve ψ.
Theorem 3. If (x, y) solves (P-5) and (u, v) solves (P-6), then
∑
a
yt+1,sa = xt+1,s +
∑
s′,a
Ps′asyts′a, t ∈ [T − 1], (5a)
vts = min
a
(
utsa +
∑
s′
Psas′vt+1,s′
)
, t ∈ [T − 1], (5b)
utsa = φtsa(ytsa), vts = ψ(xts), t ∈ [T ], a ∈ [A], (5c)
for all s ∈ [S] with ∑
a
y1sa = x1s and vTs = min
a
uTsa.
Further, if ytsa > 0, then
a ∈ argmin
a′∈[A]
uTsa′ , t = T,
a ∈ argmin
a′∈[A]
(
utsa′ +
∑
s′
Psa′s′vt+1,s′
)
, t ∈ [T − 1], (6)
for all s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A].
Proof. See Section VI-A.
Remark 2. Compared with that of Theorem 2, the equilibrium
in Theorem 3 contains an additional divergence variable x,
which is coupled with flow variable y and potential variable
v via (5a) and, respectively, (5c).
The optimization problems in (P-5) and (P-6) can be inter-
preted as an economic market as follows. The demand side
corresponds to the sources on state nodes, injecting flow into
the Markovian network. The supply side corresponds to the
Markovian network itself, offering policies to reach the root
node with corresponding potentials. In particular, consider a
degenerate case where T = S = A = 1, then optimization
problems in (P-5) and (P-6) reduce to the following:
max.
y≥0
∫ y
0
ψ(α)dα−
∫ y
0
φ(α)dα (P-5.1)
min.
v
∫ v
φ(0)
φ−1(β)dβ +
∫ ψ(0)
v
ψ−1(β)dβ (P-6.1)
The above primal-dual pair has an economics interpretation
in terms of the Marshallian supply-demand paradigm [7]. The
flow y and potential v has the interpretation of quantity and,
respectively, price in a economic market. The functions φ and
ψ represent the supply and, respectively, demand curve. The
5objectives in problem (P-5.1) and (P-6.1) each represent the
social surplus of this market, written as integral of quantity
y and, respectively, price v. Social surplus measures the total
welfare of consumers and producers. Its optimum is achieved
at the intersection point of supply and demand curve. See
Fig. 3 for an illustration. Notice that by construction, the
integral objective in (P-6.1) upper bounds the one in (P-5.1),
hence weak duality always holds.
The optimal flow and potential problems defined by (P-5)
and (P-6) seem like a generalization to the optimal distribution
and differential problem defined in (P-3) and (P-4). However,
they are essentially equivalent, as we now show.
Consider the following variation of problem (P-5):
min.
y,x
∑
t,s,a
∫ ytsa
0
φtsa(α)dα−
∑
t,s
∫ xts
0
ψts(α)dα
s.t.
∑
a
y1sa = x1s,∑
a
yt+1,sa = xt+1,s +
∑
s′,a
Ps′asyts′a, t ∈ [T − 1],
ytsa ≥ 0, xts ≤ xts, ∀t ∈ [T ], s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A].
(P-5.2)
where xts is an overestimate of the divergence on state node
ts and is readily available in most practical applications.
Using the change of variables, zts = xts − xts, for all
s ∈ [S], we can decompose the second term of the objective
function in (P-5.2) as follows:∫ xts
0
ψts(α)dα = constant−
∫ zts
0
ψts(xts − α)dα,
where ψts(xts − ·) is obtained by flipping ψts(·) about a
vertical axis passing through xts/2. Substituting this into
(P-5.2) and dropping the constant term in the objective, we
obtain the following optimization:
min.
y,z
∑
t,s,a
∫ ytsa
0
φtsa(α)dα+
∑
t,s
∫ zts
0
ψts(xts − α)dα
s.t. z1s +
∑
a
y1sa = x1s,
zt+1,s +
∑
a
yt+1,sa = xt+1,s +
∑
s′,a
Ps′asyts′a,
t ∈ [T − 1],
ytsa ≥ 0, zs ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [T ], s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A].
(P-5.3)
The dual of (P-5.3) is given by the following:
max.
u,v,w
∑
t,s
xtsvts −
∑
t,s,a
∫ utsa
φtsa(0)
φ−1tsa(β)dβ
−∑
t,s
∫ wts
ψts(xts)
(xts − ψ−1ts (β))dβ
s.t. vTs ≤ uTsa,
vts ≤ utsa +
∑
s′∈[S]
Psas′vt+1,s′ , t ∈ [T − 1],
vts ≤ wts, ∀t ∈ [T ], s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A].
(P-6.3)
where wts denotes cost of not entering the network at state
node ts. In other words, optimization in (P-5.3) and (P-6.3)
are equivalent to those in (P-5) and, respectively, (P-6) when
variable divergence is upper bounded.
Alternatively, we can construct optimization (P-5.3) and
(P-6.3) from problem (P-3) and (P-4) in Section II-B as
follows. We introduce an additional overflow edge on each
state node that directly reaches the root node. The overflow
edge originates from state node ts has a characteristic curve
described by ψts(xts − ·); its flow and tension are denoted
by zts and respectively, wts. Then problem (P-3) and (P-4)
defined on this augmented network with fixed divergence x
take exactly the form of (P-5.3) and, respectively, (P-6.3).
Therefore, we conclude that in a Markovian network, the
optimal flow and potential problems are actually equivalent
to optimal distribution and differential problems. later in
Section III, we show that such equivalence makes numerical
algorithms designed for problems (P-3) and (P-4) readily
available to problems (P-5.3) and (P-6.3).
D. Multi-commodity Flows
Observe that problem (P-3) and (P-4) in Section II-B
can model agents with heterogeneous planning horizon by
allowing flow entering the Markovian network at different
time. However, they require all flow to exit the network at
t = T , which meaning all agents’ planning horizon must end
simultaneously. Such assumption is obviously very restrictive.
In this section, we discuss some modifications to problem
(P-3) and (P-4) to also allow the flow exiting the network
at any time. In particular, we identify different flows by their
exiting time, i.e., all flow exiting at time τ is considered as one
single commodity labeled by τ . In this sense, Section II-B only
considers single commodity case, whereas the current section
will be devoted to its multi-commodity generalization.
Consider the following multi-commodity optimal distribu-
tion problem in a Markovian network:
min.
y
∑
t,s,a
∫ ∑
τ,τ≥t
y
(τ)
tsa
0
φtsa(α)dα
s.t.
∑
a
y
(τ)
1sa = p
(τ)
1s∑
a
y
(τ)
t+1,sa = p
(τ)
t+1,s +
∑
s′,a
Ps′asy
(τ)
ts′a, t ∈ [τ − 1],
y
(τ)
tsa ≥ 0, ∀τ ∈ C, t ∈ [τ ], s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A]
(P-7)
where C ⊆ [T ] is the index set of commodities. We assume,
without loss of generality, that T ∈ C. When |C| = 1, problem
(P-7) reduces to its single commodity case in (P-3). When
|C| > 1, (P-7) solves for the equilibrium of |C| commodities. In
particular, y(τ)tsa denotes the flow in commodity τ that uses edge
tsa, p(τ)ts denotes the flow in commodity τ that enters at state
node ts ; the total flow using edge tsa is given by aggregated
flow
∑
τ,τ≥t y
(τ)
tsa, the tension on edge tsa is governed by
characteristic curve φtsa.
The dual of optimization problem (P-7) is given by the
following multi-commodity optimal differential problem:
max.
u,v
∑
t,s
∑
τ,τ≥t
p
(τ)
ts v
(τ)
ts −
∑
t,s,a
∫ utsa
φtsa(0)
φ−1tsa(β)dβ
s.t. v(τ)τs ≤ uτsa,
v
(τ)
ts ≤ utsa +
∑
s′
Psas′v
(τ)
t+1,s′ , t ∈ [τ − 1],
∀τ ∈ C, s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A]
(P-8)
where utsa denotes the tension on edge tsa, v
(τ)
ts denotes the
potential on state node ts considered by commodity τ .
6As a result of problem (P-7) and (P-8), the following
theorem gives the multi-commodity extension to Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. If y solves (P-7) and (u, v) solves (P-8), then∑
a
y
(τ)
t+1,sa = p
(τ)
t+1,s +
∑
s,a
Ps′asy
(τ)
ts′a, t ∈ [τ − 1], (7a)
v
(τ)
ts = min
a
(
utsa +
∑
s′
Psas′v
(τ)
t+1,s′
)
, t ∈ [τ − 1], (7b)
utsa = φtsa
( ∑
τ,τ≥t
y
(τ)
tsa
)
, t ∈ [τ ], a ∈ [A] (7c)
for all s ∈ [S], τ ∈ C with ∑a y(τ)1sa = p(τ)1s and v(τ)τs =
min
a
uτsa. Further, if y
(τ)
tsa > 0, then
a ∈ argmin
a′∈[A]
uτsa′ , t = τ,
a ∈ argmin
a′∈[A]
(
utsa +
∑
s′
Psa′s′v
(τ)
t+1,s′
)
, t ∈ [τ − 1], (8)
for all τ ∈ C, s ∈ [S], a, a′ ∈ [A].
Proof. See Section VI-B.
Compared with the single commodity case in Section II-B,
the Kolmogorov equation in (7a) contains |C| copies of the
Kolmogorov equation in (3a), one for each commodity; same
with the Bellman equation in (7b) and (3b) . The coupling
among different commodities is due only to generalized Ohm’s
law in (7c). In the following section, we exploit such structure
in the design of algorithms for finding multi-commodity
equilibrium.
III. ALGORITHMS
Theorem 1 shows that problem (P-1) and (P-2) can be solved
by evaluating (2) using dynamic programming, which is much
more efficient than generic linear programming methods [14].
Unfortunately, dynamic programming do not directly apply to
(P-3)–(P-8) due to their additional equilibrium conditions in
(3c), (5c) and (7c), respectively. Two natural questions then
arise: can we still utilize dynamic programming for solving
(P-3)–(P-8)? If so, does such utilization lead to efficiency
improvements similar to the case of (P-1) and (P-2)? In this
section, we answer the first question by proposing dynamic
programming based algorithms for (P-3)–(P-8). Later in Sec-
tion IV-B, these algorithms outperform commercial software
over extensive numerical experiments, answering the second
question positively.
We first review the dynamic programming algorithm for
(P-1) and (P-2) in Section III-A. Based on that, in Sec-
tion III-B, we develop iterative algorithms for problem (P-3)
and problem (P-4), which solves problem (P-1) and respec-
tively, (P-2), at each iteration. Section III-C and Section II-D
discuss how these algorithms can be generalized to the case of
variable divergence in (P-5) and (P-6), and multi-commodity
flow in (P-7) and (P-8).
For simplicity, we will use the following notation: for all
y ∈ RT×S×A and x ∈ RT×S , denote φ(y) the tensor whose
tsa-th component is φtsa(ytsa); ψ(x) the tensor whose ts-th
component is ψts(xts).
A. Linear Optimal Distribution and Differential Problems
Problem (P-2) can be solved by Algorithm 1, which is
a direct evaluation of Bellman equation in (1b). The “min”
operation in Line 1 and Line 4 returns both the value and
argument of the minimum, and assign them to corresponding
entry of optimal potential v and optimal policy pi, respectively.
With such an optimal policy, problem (P-1) can be solved
by Algorithm 2, which is an evaluation of the Kolmogorov
equation in (1a) by assigning flow to the optimal policy.
Algorithm 1 is known as the dynamic programming solution
of an MDP [14], [15]. Compared with general linear program-
ming algorithms, dynamic programming is a more efficient
way to solve both (P-1) and (P-2), due to its exploitation of the
sparsity structure. For example, to solve problem (P-2) (linear
program with TS variables and TSA inequality constraints),
an interior point algorithm will cost O(T 3.5S3.5A1.5) arith-
metic operations [30]; on the other hand, Algorithm 1 only
costs O(TS2A) (Line 4 in Algorithm 1 needs to be evaluated
for all t ∈ [T − 1] and s ∈ [S]; each evaluation costs O(SA)
arithmetic operations). In the sequel, we use Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2 as building blocks to develop algorithms for
general Markovian network optimization problems.
Algorithm 1 Backward induction
Input: P , c, T .
Output: v, pi.
1: Let (vTs, piTs)← mina cTsa for all s ∈ [S].
2: for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1 do
3: for each s ∈ [S] do
4: (vts, pits)← min
a
(
ctsa +
∑
s′
Psas′vt+1,s′
)
5: end for
6: end for
Algorithm 2 Forward induction
Input: pi, p, P , T .
Output: y.
1: Initialize y = 0, let y1spi1s ← p1s for all s ∈ [S].
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 do
3: for each s ∈ [S] do
4: yt+1,spit+1,s ← pt+1,s +
∑
s′,a
Ps′asyts′a
5: end for
6: end for
B. Optimal Distribution and Differential Problem
Now we develop iterative algorithms for the optimal dis-
tribution and differential problems on a Markovian network.
Specifically, we design a Frank-Wolfe algorithm for problem
(P-3) and a projected subgradient algorithm for problem (P-4).
Each iteration of these algorithms calls Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2 as subroutines. Compared with general algorithms
for convex optimization, our algorithms exploit the structure
of the underlying Markovian network via the more efficient
dynamic programming solution to MDPs.
71) Optimal Distribution Problem: The optimal distribu-
tion problem in (P-3) contains a continuously differentiable
convex objective and a set of polyhedral constraints. When
the objective becomes linear, it reduces to the linear optimal
distribution problem in (P-1) that has an efficient close-form
solution. Such structure is well exploited by Frank-Wolfe
method [31], which is one of the most popular algorithms for
the optimal flow problem in traffic assignment [10, Sec. 4.1].
The algorithm alternates between a linearization step, which
solves a subproblem whose objective linearly approximates
the original one, and an update step, which obtains the next
iterate as a convex combination of the current iterate and the
solution to the current linearized subproblem. We summarize
the Frank-Wolfe algorithm applied to the optimization problem
(P-3) in Algorithm 3, where the initial value y0 satisfies the
constraints in (P-3). Algorithm 3 converges to optimum at the
rate of O(1/K) with step size αk = 2/(k+1) [32, Thm 3.8].
Algorithm 3 Frank-Wolfe method
Input: p, P, φ, T, y0, {αk}.
1: for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K do
2: (v, pi)←Alg. 1(P, φ(yk), T ).
3: y ← Alg. 2(pi, p, P, T ).
4: yk+1 ← yk − αk(yk − y)
5: end for
2) Optimal Differential Problem: The optimization prob-
lem in (P-4) can be written as follows:
max .
u
g(u)− ∑
t,s,a
∫ utsa
φtsa(0)
φ−1tsa(β)dβ (P-4.1)
where g(u) is the optimal value of the linear optimal differen-
tial problem (P-2) where c = u. The idea is to decompose the
joint optimization over v and u in (P-4) into an outer problem
(P-4.1), which optimizes over u alone, and an inner problem
that optimizes v given value of u, which is exactly problem
(P-2). Strong duality between the linear programs (P-1) and
(P-2) implies that
g(u) =
∑
t,s,a
ytsautsa, y ∈ ∂g(u). (9)
where y denotes the optimizer of problem (P-1) with cost
u per edge, ∂g(u) is the subdifferential of function g at u
defined as [33, Sec. 23]
∂g(u) := {y | g(u) ≥ g(u′) + 〈y, u− u′〉, ∀u′} ,
where 〈y, u−v〉 =∑t,s,a ytsa(utsa−vtsa). Such dual decom-
position was first proposed in the traffic assignment literature
[34], and has a wide range of applications in constrained
network optimization problem [3].
Based on this decomposition, we propose the projected
subgradient method [34] in Algorithm 4 for the optimal
differential problem (P-4), where Line 4 denotes the pro-
jection onto the domain of function φ, i.e., Projφ[u
′] =
argminu∈dom(φ) ‖u− u′‖2 and, y − φ−1(uk) is the subgra-
dient of the objective function in (P-4.1), due to the rela-
tion in (9). Algorithm 4 converges to optimum at the rate
of O(1/√K) with αk = 1/√k [32, Thm. 3.2]. We note
that Algorithm 4 is equivalent to backpropagation algorithm
applied to a fully connected neural network composed of co-
volution and min-pooling layers [35], where Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2 represent the forward evaluation and respectively,
backward error propagation of the neural network.
Algorithm 4 Subgradient method
Input: p, P, φ, T, u0, {αk}.
1: for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K do
2: (v, pi)← Alg. 1(P, uk, T )
3: y ←Alg. 2(pi, p, P, T )
4: uk+1 ← Projφ
[
uk + αk
(
y − φ−1(uk))]
5: end for
Algorithm 5 Augmented Frank-Wolfe method
Input: x, P, φ, ψ, T, y0, z0, {αk}.
1: for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K do
2: (v, pi)← Alg. 1(P, φ(yk), T ).
3: z ← x σ(v > ψ(x− zk))
4: y ← Alg. 2 (pi, x− z, P, T ).
5: yk+1 ← yk − αk(yk − y)
6: zk+1 ← zk − αk(zk − z)
7: end for
Algorithm 6 Augmented subgradient method
Input: P, x, φ, ψ, T, u0, w0, {αk}.
1: for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K do
2: (v, pi)← Alg. 1(P, uk, T )
3: z ← x σ(v > wk)
4: y ← Alg. 2 (pi, x− z, P, T ).
5: uk+1 ← Projφ
[
uk + αk
(
y − φ−1(uk))]
6: wk+1 ← Projψ
[
wk + αk
(
z − x+ ψ−1(wk)− z)]
7: end for
C. Optimal Flow and Potential Problems
As we pointed out in Section II-C, optimal flow and poten-
tial problem is equivalent to optimal distribution and differen-
tial problem in an augmented network, which takes the form of
(P-5.3) and (P-6.3). This suggests that the algorithms designed
in Section III-B can be applied to the optimization problems
in (P-5.3) and (P-6.3), respectively, via proper modification. In
particular, the modified Frank-Wolfe and subgradient method
is summarized in Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6, respectively.
In Line 3 of Algorithm 5,  denotes the elementwise product,
and σ(v > w) returns a T ×S tensor whose ts element is 1 if
vts > wts, and 0 otherwise. Same for Line 3 in Algorithm 6.
The main difference between Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 5
is as follows. After obtaining an optimal policy, Algorithm 3
propagates all flow via Kolmogorov equation (Line 3). On the
other hand, Algorithm 5 will first see, for every state node, if
using overflow edges costs less than not using them: if so, the
flow generated on that state node is assigned to overflow edges
(Line 3); otherwise, it will be propagated via Kolmogorov
equation (Line 4).
8The main difference between Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 6
is as follows. Algorithm 4 is based on the dual decomposition
in (P-4.1). Algorithm 6, on the other hand, is based on the
following dual decomposition of problem (P-6.3):
max.
u,w
g(u,w)−∑
tsa
∫ utsa
φtsa
φ−1tsa(β)dβ
−∑
t,s
∫ wts
ψts(xts)
(xts − ψ−1ts (β))dβ
(P-6.4)
Using a strong duality argument similar to the one used in (9),
one can show that (y, z) ∈ ∂g(uk, wk), where z and y are
computed by Line 3 and, respectively, Line 4 in Algorithm 6.
D. Multi-commodity Flows
As we pointed out in Section II-D, the optimality conditions
of multi-commodity optimal distribution and differential prob-
lems are merely |C| copies of the Kolmogorov and Bellman
equations, coupled together by generalized Ohm’s law. Based
on this observation, we propose Algorithm 7 for problem
(P-7), and Algorithm 8 for problem (P-8). In line 2 of
Algorithm 7, y ∈ RT×S×A denotes the total flow on edges,
yτ ∈ Rτ×S×A denotes the τ -th commodity flow whose tsa-th
component is y(τ)tsa;
⊕
denotes the flow aggregation operator
such that y =
⊕
τ yτ if and only if
ytsa =
∑
τ,τ≥t
y
(τ)
tsa, ∀t ∈ [T ], s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A].
Similarly for line 6 of Algorithm 8.
Observe that Line 3–7 in Algorithm 7 are same as Line 2–4
in Algorithm 3 repeated |C| times, one for each commodity;
the difference is that Algorithm 7 first compute the aggregated
flow in Line 2, then uses the corresponding tension in Line 4.
Similarly for Line 6 in Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 7 Aggregated Frank-Wolfe method
Input: p, P, φ, C, y0τ for all τ ∈ C, {αk}.
1: for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K do
2: y ←⊕τ ykτ
3: for each τ ∈ C do
4: (vτ , piτ )←Alg. 1(P, φ(y), τ).
5: yτ ← Alg. 2(piτ , p, P, τ).
6: yk+1τ ← ykτ − αk(ykτ − yτ )
7: end for
8: end for
Algorithm 8 Aggregated subgradient method
Input: p, P, φ, C, u0, {αk}.
1: for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K do
2: for each τ ∈ C do
3: (vτ , piτ )← Alg. 1(P, uk, τ)
4: yτ ←Alg. 2(piτ , p, P, τ)
5: end for
6: y ←⊕τ yτ
7: uk+1 ← Projφ
[
uk + αk
(
y − φ−1(uk))]
8: end for
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we first show how to use the equilibrium
model in Section II to design transportation network via
an illustrative example, then demonstrate the efficiency of
algorithms in Section III by comparing them with commercial
software Gurobi over extensive numerical experiments.
A. Multi-commodity Ridesharing Game
We consider the game played by ridesharing drivers in
Seattle competing for customers. We first abstract Seattle area
as an undirected graph illustrated in Fig. 4, whose nodes
denote various neighborhoods in Seattle, and edges denote
available routes labeled by its driving distance. We denote Ns
the set of nodes that share an edge with node s in this graph.
We model the decision making of an ridesharing driver on a
typical weekend night (7pm-1am) as an MDP defined by the
following.
Fig. 4: Seattle transportation network and candidate LRT
routes: 7-9-10-11(red) and 6-8-9-11(blue).
• Time steps: t = 1, 2, . . . , 36 denotes the (end of) 10-
minute-intervals between 7pm and 1am.
• States: [S] correspond to different nodes in graph G.
• Actions: in state s, as′ denotes picking up an awaiting
rider with destination s′ for all s′ ∈ Ns; await denotes
waiting for a future rider.2
• Transition kernel: we assume Psas′ is given by
Psas′ =
{
1 if a = as′ , s′ ∈ Ns
1/(|Ns|+ 1) if a = await, s′ ∈ Ns ∪ {s}
All other entries of Psas′ are zero. Here we use an
uniform distribution over neighboring states to describe
the uncertain destinations of future riders.3
2We assume all states have 6 actions; for states with less than 5 neighbors,
all extra actions are treated as await.
3Such distribution can be approximated more accurately using historical
data in practical applications.
9• Cost: Due to the competition among drivers, we assume
the profit for picking up a rider decreases with the amount
of drivers making the same offer, namely
ftss′ = α+ β
(
1− ytsas′
γtss′
)
distss′ (10)
for all t ∈ [T ], s ∈ [S], where α and β is the baseline
profit and, respectively, nominal profit per mile, distss′ is
the distance(miles) between s and s′, γtss′ measures the
rider demand from s to s′ at time t, and finally ytsas′ is
the amount of drivers choosing action as′ in state s at
time t. The cost of action a in state s is a function of
ytsa defined as follows
φtsa(ytsa) =
−ftss′ if a = as′ , s
′ ∈ Ns
− ∑
s′∈Ns
Psas′ftss′ if a = await
• Planning time windows: We assume that 10 drivers start
working from each state every 10 minutes from 7pm till
9pm. To prevent driver fatigue, each driver will only work
for 4 consecutive hours , i.e., p(t+24)ts = 10 for all s ∈ [S]
and t = 1, 2, . . . , 12.
Notice that since drivers can start the game at different time
during 1 ≤ t ≤ 12 and they will only plan for the next 24
time steps since they started. In other words, drivers with
heterogeneous planning time windows will coexist in the
network for t = 2, 3, . . . , 24. Therefore the equilibrium of
this game can be modeled as a multi-commodity Markovian
network equilibrium discussed in Section III-D. We simulate
the scenario where α = 10, β = 0.2, γtss′ is given in Table II
and distss′ is given in Fig. 4. We demonstrate the driver
number at downtown area D = {9, 10, 11} via Fig. 5, where
we can see that driver number increase during 1 ≤ t ≤ 12,
then decrease during 24 ≤ t ≤ 36. There are also two sudden
changes in the increasing/decreasing speed around t = 7 and
t = 31, which is due to the corresponding changes in values
of γ in Table II. This example clearly extends the single-
commodity case considered in [12] where all players enter
and exit the game simultaneously.
Further, our model can help evaluate plans of light rail tran-
sit(LRT) by predicting its impact on the driver equilibrium. For
example, suppose that Seattle city is considering two candidate
LRT routes, 7-9-10-11 and 6-8-9-11 (see Fig. 4), as means
to alleviate the congestion caused by the ridesharing driver
in downtown area, assuming LRT will reduce the demand of
ridesharing service (namely, value of γtss′) by 50% along its
route. The simulated equilibrium with different LRT routes are
also given in Fig. 5, which shows that route 6-8-9-11 is more
effective that route 7-9-10-11 in terms of reducing amount
of drivers in D. These results clearly demonstrate the power
of Markovian network equilibrium model in transportation
system design.
B. Computation Experiments
In order to demonstrate the efficiency of the algorithms
developed in Section III, we compare the computation time
of our algorithms against commercial software Gurobi (http:
//www.gurobi.com). For simplicity, we only consider fixed
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Fig. 5: Driver numbers in downtown area D = {9, 10, 11}.
TABLE II: Values of γ where D = {9, 10, 11}.
γtss′ s /∈ D
s′ ∈ D
s ∈ D
s′ ∈ D
s ∈ D
s′ /∈ D
s /∈ D
s′ /∈ D
1 ≤ t ≤ 6 600 200 60 60
7 ≤ t ≤ 30 200 400 200 60
31 ≤ t ≤ 36 60 100 600 60
demand single commodity cases (Algorithm 3 and 4). The
testing examples are randomly generated as follows.
• basic parameters: let Psas′ = rand(0, 1)4, then normalize
it such that
∑
s′ Psas′ = 1 for all s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A];
• cost functions: let φtsa(ytsa) = rand(1, 2)ytsa +
rand(1, 2) and ψts(xts) = rand(−110,−100)xts +
rand(100, 110) for all t ∈ [T ], s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A].
• divergence: let pts = rand(0, 1) for all s ∈ [S] if t = 1
and zero otherwise.
We fix T = A = 10 and let S takes values in {50, 100, 150,
200, 250, 300, 350, 400} in our testing examples. The reason
we only vary value of S is that, compared with T and A, the
computation time of Algorithm 3 and 4 is more sensitive to
the size of S since they cost O(TS2A) arithmetic operations
per iteration. We test the computation time of Algorithm 3
with step size αk = 2/(k + 2) and Algorithm 4 with step
size αk = 0.4/k, where both algorithms terminates when their
objective function value is within ±0.01% neighborhood of the
one obtained by Gurobi. The average computation time over
1000 examples, along with corresponding 3-standard deviation
interval are reported in Fig. 6. All codes are in MATLAB and
run on a 2.8GHz PC.
From results in Fig. 6 we can see that, over the randomly
generated 8000 examples, Frank-Wolfe and subgrdient method
outperform Gurobi across different problem sizes by showing
a consistent saving of 96% and, respectively, 70% of compu-
tation time.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the optimal flow and potential
problems on Markovian networks whose solutions define a
stochastic dynamic class of Wardrop equilibrium. We fur-
ther discuss generalizations to variable divergence and multi-
commodity flows, that extend the current state-of-the-art. We
4We denote rand(a, b) a random number sampled from uniform distribu-
tion over interval [a, b].
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Fig. 6: Average computation time and 3-standard deviation
intervals of 1000 experiments with T = A = 10.
also draw useful connections and parallels between disparate
bodies of literature in optimization, control theory, and eco-
nomics as well as applications domains such as routing in
transportation networks. Finally, we design efficient algorithms
to solve such optimization problem—particularly those on
large-scale networks for which state-of-the-art commercial
software is plagued by the curse of dimensionality—based on
dynamic programming. Future directions include generaliza-
tion to cases with capacity constraints [18], infinite-horizon
[13], and stochastic network optimization problems arising in a
variety of application domains such as transportation logistics.
VI. APPENDIX
In this appendix, we provide the proof for Theorem 3 and
4 using the KKT conditions of the optimal distribution/flow
problems in Section II. The derivation for the optimal differ-
ential/potential problems are similar, so we omit them.
A. Proof of Theorem 3
We first define the Lagrangian for optimization (P-5) as
follows:
L(x, y,v, µ) =
∑
t,s,a
∫ ytsa
0
φtsa(α)dα−
∑
t,s
∫ xts
0
ψts(α)dα
+
∑
t,s,a
vts(xts − ytsa)−
∑
t,s,a
µtsaytsa
+
∑
t,t<T
∑
s′,a,s
vt+1,sPs′asyts′a
where vts is the dual variable corresponding to the flow
conservation constraints at node ts, µtsa ≥ 0 is the dual
variable corresponding to the non-negative flow constraint
at edge tsa. Then the KKT conditions corresponds to this
Lagrangian are given by∑
a
yt+1,sa = xt+1,s +
∑
s′,a
Ps′asyts′a, t ∈ [T − 1],∑
a
y1sa = x1s, ytsa ≥ 0, µtsa ≥ 0, t ∈ [T ],
(A.1)
ytsaµtsa = 0, t ∈ [T ] (A.2)
∂L(x,y,v,µ)
∂yTsa
=φTsa(yTsa)− vTs − µTsa = 0,
∂L(x,y,v,µ)
∂ytsa
=φtsa(ytsa)− vts +
∑
s′
Psas′vt+1,s′ − µtsa = 0,
t ∈ [T − 1],
∂L(x,y,v,µ)
∂xts
=vts − ψts(xts) = 0, t ∈ [T ],
(A.3)
for all s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A], where (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3)
corresponds to the primal feasibility, complementary slackness
and vanishing gradient condition, respectively [29, Sec.5.5].
The complementary slackness constraints in (A.2) ensure that
(A.3) reduce to (5b), (5c) and (6).
B. Proof of Theorem 4
We first define the Lagrangian for optimization (P-7) as
follows:
L(y, v, µ) =
∑
t,s,a
∫ ∑
τ,τ≥t
y
(τ)
tsa
0
φtsa(α)dα
+
∑
τ
∑
t,t≤τ
∑
s,a
(
v
(τ)
ts (p
(τ)
ts − y(τ)tsa)− µ(τ)tsay(τ)tsa
)
+
∑
τ
∑
t,t<τ
∑
s′,a,s
v
(τ)
t+1,sPs′asy
(τ)
ts′a
where v(τ)ts is the dual variable corresponding to the flow
conservation constraints of commodity τ at node ts, and
µ
(τ)
tsa ≥ 0 is the dual variable corresponding to the non-
negative flow constraint of commodity τ at edge tsa. The
KKT conditions for the above lagrangian are given by∑
a
y
(τ)
t+1,sa = p
(τ)
t+1,s +
∑
s′,a
Ps′asy
(τ)
ts′a, t ∈ [τ − 1],∑
a
y
(τ)
1sa = p
(τ)
1s , y
(τ)
tsa ≥ 0, µ(τ)tsa ≥ 0, t ∈ [τ ],
(A.4)
y
(τ)
tsaµ
(τ)
tsa = 0, t ∈ [τ ] (A.5)
∂L(y,v,µ)
∂y
(τ)
τsa
=φτsa
( ∑
τ ′,τ ′≥τ
y
(τ ′)
τsa
)− v(τ)τs − µ(τ)τsa = 0,
∂L(y,v,µ)
∂y
(τ)
tsa
=φtsa
( ∑
τ ′,τ ′≥t
y
(τ ′)
tsa
)− v(τ)ts
+
∑
s′
Psas′v
τ
t+1,s′ − µ(τ)tsa = 0, t ∈ [τ − 1],
(A.6)
for all τ ∈ C, s ∈ [S], a ∈ [A], where (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6)
correspond to primal feasibility, complementary slackness and
vanishing gradient condition, respectively [29, Sec.5.5]. The
complementary slackness constraints in (A.5) ensures that
(A.6) reduce to (7b), (7c) and (8).
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